By James B. Freeman
This monograph first provides a mode of diagramming argument macrostructure, synthesizing the normal circle and arrow strategy with the Toulmin version. A theoretical justification of this technique via a dialectical figuring out of argument, a severe exam of Toulmin on warrants, a radical dialogue of the linked-convergent contrast, and an account of the correct reconstruction of enthymemes follows.
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Extra resources for Argument Structure:: Representation and Theory (Argumentation Library)
18 1 An Approach to Argument Macrostructure qualifier words “necessarily,” “probably,” “presumably” may actually occur in argument texts, unlike inference rules. Should such expressions be considered separate elements in argument texts, as they are treated as separate elements on the Toulmin model? I believe they are separate elements, although this may require us to construe them differently from Toulmin. More accurately, it may require us to specify with more precision just exactly what these elements are or how they function in arguments as products.
This evidence constitutes a rebutting defeater to the prosecutor’s argument. Contrast this with the following situation: A prosecution witness testifies that she saw the accused enter a certain house on the evening the house was burgled. 4 Integrating the Standard Approach and the Toulmin Model 21 eyeglasses. The defense attorney asks whether she was wearing the glasses when she made the observation. She had not yet acquired them and in fact she was not wearing any glasses at all at the time. This information is negatively relevant not to the claim that the defendant is guilty but to the reliability of the witness.
Why the challenger would ask this question leads us directly to consider the remaining element in Toulmin’s model. The challenger might be quite willing to admit that all things being equal, the premises provide a sufficient case for accepting the conclusion. The problem is that from her perspective not all things are equal. There is a question in her mind whether some condition or state of affairs holds which, should it hold, would either constitute evidence against the proponent’s conclusion or call the reliability of the proponent’s inference to that conclusion into question.